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MÉLANGES
ST ANSELM'S DEFINITIONS
In definition, Anselm finds a method of argument both con-
venient to this purposes and apparently very satisfying to him .
When he and his pupil begin on the task Anselm sets himself i n
the three treatises pertinentes ad studium sacrae scripturae t (the
De Veritate, the De Libertate A rbitrii, the De Casu Diaboli), they
discover that when Anselm discussed veritas in the Monologion ,
he did not establish a definition of ` truth ' :
Non memimi me invenisse definitionem veritatis 2 . In the
chapters of the De Veritate which follow, they work out th e
definition of veritas on which so much of Anselm's argument i n
the ` three treatises' comes to depend .
In the process of working out his chain of definitions — fo r
that is what the sequence of discussion generates — Ansel m
displays a range of definitional techniques . Yet his variety falls
far short of the number to be found in the most detailed colle-
cions of technical devices which were put together in post-classi
-
cal times . He does not seem to have been aware of the existenc e
of an ` art of definition' in quite the same way, or to the sam e
extent, as he was conscious of the precision of method require d
in syllogistic argumentation for example . It is difficult to avoid
the conclusion that he had simply not been able to read more
than a limited number of the early works which set out theories
of definition. It is even possible that ` definition ' was a tech -
nique not especially interesting to his contemporaries as a mat
-
ter for discussion and analysis in its own right — in other words ,
that the dialectical theorists had not yet taken up ` definition ' a s
1. S I .173 .2 . (S = F.S .Schmitt Anselmi Opera, (Edinburgh, 1938-61, 6 vols . )
2. S1 .176.21 .
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a lively technical issue. It is worthy of remark that Garlandus
Cornpotista does not make a point of discussing definition in
his Dialectica.
The textbooks in which Anselm and his contemporarie s
might have found basic teaching on definition include Cicero' s
De Inventione and the Topics, the Rhetorica ad Herennium ,
Boethius on Cicero's Topics, on the De Interpretatione and Vic-
torinus' work, the De Definitione, on which Cassiodorus an d
Isidore base their remarks on definition .
In the classical rhetorical works, Anselm would have discove-
red rough guidelines and simple main principles of definition :
he would have been instructed to make a brief, clear statemen t
of the matter in hand in such a way that it would be generall y
understood, and to sharpen his definition and show its applica-
bility to the issue by such techniques as enumeration of part s
and analysis into genus and species . Quintilian, as we migh t
expect, goes more deeply into the complexities of rhetorica l
definition than do either of the earlier classical rhetorica l
authors. In general, he contents himself with expanding wha t
Cicero has to say, but in one important respect he disagrees wit h
him. Cicero, he tells us, says that definition is concerned wit h
showing the identity and the difference, that is, with what th e
thing defined has in common with others, and what are th e
differences which make it individual 4 . For himself, Quintilian
prefers the view that there are three types or species of definitio n
— that which establishes whether a particular term is applicabl e
to a given thing (an hoc sit), that which decides which of tw o
terms is to be applied (hoc an hoc) and that which decides whe-
ther two apparently different things should be called by th e
same name (hoc et hoc) . Of these, perhaps the third comes clo-
sest to Anselm's concerns in the ` three treatises', but in general ,
it is not on Quintilian that we should expect to find him model -
3. A work surviving from the post-Carolingian period at St
. Gall, in Ms.
Vind . Pal . Lat
. 2508, Vienna Oesterreichische Nationalbibliothek, is discussed by
L. M. de Rijk
. It is ` a rather extensive discussion on the moods of definition '
based, it seems, not on Cassiodorus or Isidore, nor on Victorinus, but on Boe-
thius' remarks on Victorinus
. See On the Curriculum of the Arts of the Trivium a t
St. Gall from c .850-c.1000, in Vivarium I (1963) p . 57-64 .
4. Topics V .28 ; cf. Quintilian Institutio Oratoria Vll .iii .8-10.
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ling his own techniques of definition . He is very much concer-
ned with the Ciceronian method of enumeration and analysis ,
however, and it seems reasonable to assume that Anselm' s
knowledge of definition had its ultimate roots in rhetoric as wel l
as in dialectic . In the passage already quoted, Anselm speaks o f
` finding' a definition of truth ; in the Topics Cicero classifies
definition under inventio . Definition, like argument as a whole ,
may be considered an aspect of the rhetorical art in certai n
respects .
The post-classical writers on definition gave the art a dialecti-
cal twist in keeping with the technical interests of their day .
Victorinus' De Definitione takes up definition where Cicero
leaves it in the Topics s .
Cicero says that there are other kinds of definition, which
have nothing to do with the purpose of his book 6 . Victorinus ,
intrigued, and fortified with a knowledge of the techniques o f
definition known to Greek rhetoricians, sets out to discove r
them for himself. Remarking on this passage in his Topica com-
mentary, Boethius says :
hune locum Victorinus unius voluminis serie aggressus
exponere et omnes definitionum differentias enume-
rare, multas interserit, quae definitiones esse pene ab
omnibus reclamantur 7 .
He argues cogently against certain of Victorinus' views on th e
methods which may be included under the heading of defini-
tion. Victorinus, however, is writing for both dialecticians and
rhetoricians :
omnis diffinitio, aut rhetorica est oratio, aut dialectica $ .
5. Ed . T . Stangl Tulliana et Mario-Victoriana, Munich, 1888. The editor list s
a number of manuscripts of the tenth to twelfth centuries, in which the work i s
found with textbooks of the logica velus and the Pseudo-Apuleian Perihermenia s
(pp . 13-16) .
6. Topics VI .29 .
7. PL 64.1098 Boethius may be referring to the lost commentary of Victori-
nus on Cicero's Topics. If so, we may take it that Victorinus listed the same
modes of definition in this work, since Boethius lists them for us.
8. PL 64.893 . Stangl pp . 9 .24.
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He agrees with Cicero in placing definition among the topics of
argument, that is the scientia inveniendi 9 , one of many refe-
rences to the Topica, yet he mentions the Rhetorica 10 of Cicero ,
too. However ` dialectical ' his interests, Victorinus remains
perhaps a rhetorical commentator, with a primarily rhetorica l
training behind him, while Boethius reveals himself, in his criti-
cisms of this work of Victorinus', to be a dialectician making a n
especially dialectical use of the techniques of definition .
A somewhat cut-and-tried definitional procedure evolved .
Victorinus lists the four essentials as :
definitio, approbatio definitionis, deductio definitioni s
ad speciem, deinde destructio definitionis partis adver -
sae 1 1
A twelfth century logical treatise simplifies even furher :
tria requiruntur in unaquaque diffinitione : communio ,
differentia, proprietas 12 .
The difference in emphasis shows clearly how far the dialectica l
processes of definition came to diverge from the ` rhetorically '
inspired. Victorinus bases his remarks on Cicero, who is concer-
ned with the forensic orator's practical need for a technique o f
definition which will enable him to give his proposed definitio n
a foundation in fact, show how it applies to the case in hand and
refute the point of view of his opponent . The logician of the
twelfth century sees the essentials of a definition in a process o f
pointing out the genus and species and individual properties o f
the thing defined ; he is interested in isolating the individua l
item by its definition, so as to refine its meaning and make it a
properly ` controlled ' component in a sequence of formal argu-
mentation built out of technically precise terms . Even Victorinu s
bewails the fact that rhetorical definition is thoroughly unre-
liable :
9. Topics 1I .6 .
10. E .g . PL 64.902 .
11. Stangl p .22.21-5 .
12. Ed . L. M. de Rijk, Logica Modernorum, Assen, 1967, Vol . IP' p . 99 .
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Verum haec captiosa, falsa, non certa rhetorum defini -
tio 13 .
A certain tension, or at any rate, an acute awareness of diffe-
rences, is observable from an early date between dialectical an d
rhetorical methods of definition — together with a tendency t o
clarify the formal techniques, to multiply subdivisions and tech-
nicalities, to make the method more rigid than Cicero had eve r
intended, and more formal than it perhaps appears in Anselm' s
thought.
Victorinus' total of fiteen different kinds of definitio n
includes a number drawn from the parts of the Topics which
follow the passage on definition, many of which Victorinus i s
careful to attribute to Cicero . We find definition : a qualitate, ad
verbum, per translationem, per quamdam imaginationem, per
laudem, causam tribuens, together with some of their attendant
vices and expanded explanations of what is involved in each
method of definition . In writing his commentary, Boethius keep s
strictly to the order of the Ciceronian text, and the scope of hi s
own comments is thus to some extent limited by the order o f
treatment he has chosen. But he finds space in his remarks o n
Victorinus to give a detailed account of Victorinus' work, and to
criticise it roundly . It is hard to believe that Anselm's interes t
would not have been engaged by this attack if he had known
both works, and that he would not have formed views of his ow n
on the subject of definition which owed something in clarity an d
` finish ' to a resolution of the disagreements between the two
works. The evidence that his own theory of definition has bee n
formed on a consideration of two such technically detailed an d
exact sources is very slight .
Anselm gives the impression that he has learned what he
knows about definition chiefly by example, rather than by stud y
of the ` theory' of definition ; the examples he would hav e
found in Boethius' Commentaries on the De Interpretatione fi t
his own practices neatly, as we shall see . Before considering thi s
secondary, less easily-defined, method of ` influence b y
example ', we must, however, look at the evidence of correla -
13 . Stangl . p. 20.14-5 .
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tions between the Topics of Cicero and Anselm's methods of
definition ; here, if anywhere, we may find him drawing directly
on a purely theoretical knowledge of definition .
Cicero's Topics deals with certain points in the theory o f
definition with which Anselm's definitional methods have some -
thing in common. Cicero tells us that a definition is a saying
which explains what something is :
Definitio estoratio quae id quad definitur explicat quid
sit 1 4
This, of course, is Anselm's overriding aim and purpose in the
` three treatises ' . In discussing ` truth of meaning ' : (significan-
tionis veritas) he finds that an affirmation is that which signifie s
that what is, is : significat esse quad est 1 5
He wants to discover a series of definitions which will explain
exactly what truth and its fellows are . Cicero distinguishes tw o
chief kinds of definition, the definition of what exists in external
reality, and the definition of what exists only in the mind :
unum earum rerum quae sunt, alterum earum qua e
intelleguntur 16 .
Anselm, too, points out a difference between the rectitudo of
things visible and a rectitudo of notions which may be perceive d
only in the mind :
quod vero sola mente percipi dicitur, separat earn a
rectitudine visibili 17 .
Cicero explains that definitions are made partly by enumeratio n
(partitio) and partly by analysis (divisio) 18 . Partitio involves th e
division of the res proposita into its component parts (quasi in
membra discerpitur) while divisio distinguishes genus, specie s
and accidents . In dividing veritas into separate aspects, and
considering a veritas in enuntiationis, a veritas in cogitatione, a
veritas in actione, a veritas in voluntate, and so on, Anselm may
14. Topics V .26 .
15. 51 .178 .9 .
16. Topics V .26 .
17. S 1 .191 .23-4 .
18. Topics V .28 .
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be said to be using this technique of refinement and clarificatio n
of definition . A technique of definition by divisio is to be foun d
in Anselm, too . In the De Verìtate, he says that his definition o f
truth in Chapter XI contains no more and no less than i t
should 19 ; the nomen rectitudinis divides veritas from everythin g
which has no rectitudo :
nomen rectitudinis dividit earn ab omni re quae recti-
tudo non vocatur 20 .
More specifically, later in the same work, we find a reference t o
divison by genus :
Redeamus ad rectitudinem seu veritatem, quibus duo -
bus nominibus, quoniam de rectitudinem mente sola
perceptibili loquimur, una res significatur quae genu s
est iustitiae ; et quaeramus an sit una sola veritas in
omnibus illis in quibus veritatem dicimus esse, an ita
sint veritates plures, sicut plura sunt in quibus consta t
esse veritatem 21 .
Another statement of the principle that a definition should fulfi l
its task exactly, describing neither too fully nor with insufficien t
precision, occurs in the De Liberiate Arbitrii, where Anselm
shows that he considers a finished definition (perfecta definitio )
to be one which explains the genus and the specific properties o f
the thing defined :
Sed cum dicta definitio sic perfecta sit ex genere e t
differentiis, ut nec minus aliquid claudat, nec plus
quam quam quaerimus libertas nihil illi addendum
aut demendum intelligi potest 22 .
Such common ground of method as there is between Cicero an d
Anselm might almost be the result of pure chance, so comparati-
vely simple are the procedures involved, yet some commo n
terminology and a well-established habit of tacitly relying on
authority where he can find it, suggests that Anselm may in fac t
19. S1 .191 .21-2 .
20. S 1 .191 .21-4.
21. S1 .196 .28-197.2 .
22. S1 .225 .12-4 .
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be drawing on his knowledge of the Topics, if not on Cassiodo-
rus and Isidore 23 .
In two further respects, Anselm shows a knowledge of defini-
tional techniques outlined in the classical rhetorical textbooks .
Anselm defines by showing what the thing to be defined is not ,
or by opposing positive and negative statements 24 . The Auctor
ad Herennium advises the orator to show that the contrary defi-
nition to that which he proposes is false 25 , and Cicero, in the De
Inventione, makes a similar suggestion 26 . Anselm defines by a
technique of showing A to be B and B to be C, that is, by sho-
wing the likenesses and the common properties of what is to b e
defined, in a series of related concepts . Again, this method of
definition by ` synonym ' or by ` similitudo ' has its classica l
rhetorical parallels . All these apparent similarities may be no
more than apparent ; they do not seem to add up to an altoge-
ther convincing case for the view that Anselm's definitiona l
technique depends on the theoretical schemes of the textbooks .
The terminological correspondences are not close, except in a
few instances of little real significance . Anselm's use of the word
genus or divisio, for example, may have a number of alternativ e
souces .
It seems far more likely that Anselm learned his definitiona l
technique by example, perhaps from Boethius' Commentarie s
on Aristotle's De Intetpretatione . Anselm tells us on numerou s
occasions in the ` three treatises' that he is engaged in a defini-
tional exercise . and that he clearly sets out with the consciou s
intention of formulating a series of definitions . He thus employ s
a specific technical term — definitio — and a procedure — tha t
of constructing a series of related definitions of interrelate d
terms -- in very much Boethius' fashion . In the Commentariues
on the De Interpretatione Boethius develops a series of defini-
tions of nomen, verbum, oratio, enuntiatio in much the same way
as Anselm develops his definitions of veritas, rectitudo, iustitia.
23. Cassiodorus : PL 70.1173-5 ; Isidore : Etymologies 1I .29.
24. S 1 .179 .22, S 1 .181 .22, for example .
25. Rhetorica ad Herennium 1I .xii .17 .
26. De Inventione 11
.xviì.54.
27. In Librum Aristotelis HEPI EPMHNEIAE ed . C . Meiser (Leipzig 1877 )
I p . 51 .6-9, and see II p. 53
.1-6 .
9 9
Like Boethius, Anselm is trying to extend and explore every
corner of meaning implied in the terms, by a process of subdivi -
sion and refinement of definition .
In the first version of the Commentary, Boethius explain s
that if one says the nomen is a vox, one draws the definition
from the genus :
quod dixit nomen esse vocem, traxit a genere definitio-
nem.
Anselm could well have found here his source of the practice of
defining by genus . Boethius remarks that a definition should fi t
its object precisely, neither exceeding nor falling short of exact-
ness :
omnem, inquit, definitionem vel contractiorem esse
definita specie vel excedere non oportet 28 .
Here, too, Anselm may have got his own notion . Boethius can b e
seen to proceed by enumeration and analysis . Beginning with
the statement that : nomen est vox significativa 29 , Boethius goes
on the show stage by stage what modifications and develop-
ments of this statement must be made, until he arrives at this
definition :
nomen est vox significativa secundum placitum sine
tempore, cuius nulla pars significativa est separata ,
definitum aliquid significans, cum est aut non est iuncta
faciens enuntiationem 3 0
In just this way, Anselm moves from a simple statement to a
more and more complex definition, from :
rectitudo mihi videtur idem esse quod iustitia 3 1
to :
Beneigiturdiximus iustitiamesse rectitudinem volunta-
tis servatam propter se, id est quae servatur propter
se
32 .
28. Ibid. II p . 82.28 .
29. Ibid. I p . 4 .5 .
30. Ibid. I p . 55 .15-8 .
31. S I .191
.27-8 .
32. S1 .196 .19-20 .
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Boethius insists that a definition must be an oratio, that is mor e
than a single nomen or synonymous term. This is perhaps th e
point in which he takes issue against Victorinus most energe-
tically . He explains that Victorinus includes the nomen among
the definitions :
inter definitiones enim ponit et nomina 3 3
when Aristotle explicitly excludes it :
pernegatque in Topicis nomine fieri definitionem a 4
Cicero, he adds, says that a definition must be an oratio . Anselm
himself clearly prefers to define in complete sentences, or at
least in whole phrases and clauses, rather than in single words o r
mere synonyms. The overwhelming impression conveyed b y
Anselm's exercises in definition, is that he relies heavily o n
Boethius' example and, perhaps a little, on Cicero's Topics. If
this is so, definition in Anselm's hands should perhaps be regar-
ded as a Boethian rather than a ` rhetorical' exercise .
Yet this area does not seem to be one in which Anselm
depends heavily on a technically exact training -- as he must d o
in syllogistic argumentation. As his use of a variety of differen t
methods shows, Anselm is heir to a long tradition beginning, fo r
the Latin-speaking scholar, with Cicero and the textbooks o f
classical rhetoric . Definition is an aspect of rhetorical argumen t
as well as of dialectic . In Anselm's use of definition we fin d
another of the fine threads which connect classical rhetorica l
theory with the actual practice of eleventh century writers .
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